We propose a new efficient automatic verification technique, Athena, for security protocol analysis. It uses a new efficient representation -our extension to the Strand Space Model, and utilizes techniques from both model checking and theorem proving approaches. Athena is fully automatic and is able to prove the correctness of many security protocols with arbitrary number of concurrent runs. The run time for a typical protocol from the literature, like the Needham-Schroeder protocol, is often a fraction of a second.
Introduction
Security protocols are communication protocols that use cryptography to achieve goals such as authentication and key distribution. They are the basis of any secure system, and usually have to be redesigned as new systems and applications emerge. However, many examples have shown that security protocols may contain subtle errors that remain undiscovered for years, even when the protocols are carefully designed. Therefore, we cannot rely on ad hoc and informal ways of reasoning, and it is crucial to apply formal methods to security protocol analysis.
One of the promising directions in this area is the use of automatic tools. Automatic tools have the practical advantage that they are easy to use, and they have been successfully applied to find flaws in some proposed protocols. Unfortunately, previously available tools severely suffer from the state space explosion which prevents them from analyzing complicated protocols. This is mainly due to the complexity of the intruder behavior, asynchronous composition, and symmetry redundancy in the traditional verification approaches. Most of these tools are also limited to checking the properties of a security protocol under small configurations, e.g. with two initiators and two responders.
In this paper we propose a new automatic verification algorithm, Athena. Athena can provide proofs of properties of a security protocol under arbitrary configurations, and exploits several state space reduction techniques which greatly reduce the state space explosion problem.
Related Work
Previous automatic tools for security protocol analysis include general-purpose model checkers such as FDR [18, 15] and Mur [26] , and special-purpose model checkers, for example, the Interrogator [25] and Brutus [10] . These tools start with an initial state of a protocol execution and then exhaustively search through all possible sequences of actions of both legitimate principals and a modeled attacker to see whether an attack could happen. All these tools have been successfully applied to find attacks on protocols. But they all suffer from two main problems:
1. Bounded number of principles. All of these tools have to specify in advance the maximum number of principals that can participate in the protocol, which means that they can only check whether a protocol is correct for a limited number of participants. Even if they do not find an attack on the protocol, it is still possible that the protocol might have an attack with a higher number of participants. Lowe has overcome this problem in some cases by proving manually that a small number of participants is enough to prove the correctness for arbitrary number of runs [18, 20] . 2. State space explosion problem. Although these tools explore a number of state reduction techniques, they still suffer from the state space explosion problem. This restricts their applicability to protocols with only a small number of participants, e.g. three or five, which send and receive a small number of messages in each protocol run.
The above techniques are based on the traditional trace-based model (TBM), where each principal is modeled by a process. The global state space of the protocol is a Cartesian product of local state spaces of individual processes. The state transition of each local process is based on sending or receiving a message. The processes are composed asynchronously, and the global transition relation is an interleaving of local transitions. Due to such parallel composition and the interleaving semantics, the number of states and transitions to be explored grows exponentially with the number of participants involved in the protocol [30, 31] . Hence, these approaches suffer severely from the state space explosion problem, and are often only able to verify protocols with small number of participants, e.g. three or five. This problem is especially acute for the explicit state enumeration techniques.
Multiple concurrent runs of a security protocol may yield many principals with identical roles, and in this case the transition graph often possesses a lot of symmetries. Although some reduction techniques have been used to reduce the search space, including partial order and symmetry reductions [8] , a large number of states and transitions still have to be checked unnecessarily.
The NRL Protocol Analyzer [22] is another special-purpose tool that uses a theorem proving approach for security protocol analysis. It starts from an insecure state and performs a backward search trying to prove that this insecure state is unreachable. It can use many theorem proving techniques such as inductive methods. The advantage of this approach is that it can prove a protocol correct for arbitrary number of participants. However, it often requires non-trivial amount of human interaction and expertise, and the running time could be much slower than in the model checking approach [24] . The NRL Protocol Analyzer reduces symmetry redundancy by using symbolic variables. But it also uses the traditional TBM and asynchronous composition, and hence, is still not optimal in terms of the state space explosion problem.
There are also other approaches which use general purpose theorem provers such as Isabelle [29] . These approaches require more expertise with theorem provers and more human interaction, and have the disadvantage that they cannot generate counterexamples directly.
Apart from the above approaches, there are also some tools [4, 5, 17] based on belief logics such as BAN logic [6] and GNY logic [13] , that have been used to find flaws in some protocols.
Overview of Our Techniques
We use our extension to the Strand Space Model (SSM) instead of the traditional TBM to represent protocol executions. Thayer, Herzog and Guttman proposed SSM for protocol representation and demonstrated how to use SSM to prove certain security properties manually, for example authentication and secrecy [36] . (Notice that SSM is a new model for representing protocol executions and has nothing to do with strands in the context of category theory or other mathematical theories.) Because SSM has the advantage that it contains the exact causal relation information, the authors have been able to derive much simpler proofs of a protocol's properties in comparison with the traditional TBM. However, their proof technique requires a lot of human insight and will be difficult to automate. We have extended their model and developed a new algorithm, Athena, for analyzing security protocols automatically.
We have designed a new logic suitable for SSM that can express various security properties, including authentication, secrecy, and electronic commerce properties. We have also developed an automatic procedure for evaluating well-formed formulas in this logic. If the evaluation procedure terminates, it generates either a proof or a counterexample, depending on the validity of the formula. The validation procedure is not guaranteed to terminate, but it terminates for the protocols we experimented with. Even when the procedure does not terminate for a general case (when we allow arbitrary configurations of the protocol execution), termination can be forced by bounding the number of concurrent protocol runs and the length of messages. This is similar to the bounds in current model checkers such as FDR, Mur , and Brutus.
We formulate our verification procedure in terms of a proof search in a very specialized proof system. Athena first transforms the security property to be verified into an initial sequent which contains an initial state. It then applies a small set of inference rules with certain decision procedures to the states, building a proof tree, until it either completes the proof or refutes a sequent. In the latter case Athena reports the protocol to be incorrect, and the state of the refuted sequent represents a counterexample, or a successful attack on the protocol.
One main difference between Athena and previous approaches is that Athena uses fundamentally different representation of protocol executions. As described above, most of the existing approaches are based on TBM, in which each principal is modeled by a process, and its local transition is based on sending/receiving a message. The protocol model in TBM is the asynchronous parallel composition of these processes. Instead, Athena uses our extension to SSM, a much more compact state structure based on semi-bundles and goal-bindings. The goal-binding is the causal relation " " that captures the exact information about the origins of messages in a protocol execution. A set of protocol runs that differ only in the order of interleaving executions of individual parties is in fact represented by one state in Athena, and Athena can reason about all such executions simultaneously. This form of the state structure allows us to develop efficient state search procedures avoiding the exponential growth of the state space due to asynchronous composition.
Similarly to the NRL Protocol Analyzer, Athena also takes advantage of symbolic state representation, in contrast to the explicit representation used in most of previous model checking approaches. In our approach, we allow a state to contain free variables. In a way, a state is parameterized by these free variables and, therefore, represents a (possibly infinite) set of concrete protocol executions. Thus, Athena can represent states and state transitions efficiently, and in particular, naturally reduces the symmetry redundancy problem.
To reduce the search space further, our approach can use pruning theorems to prove early that some states do not contribute to the final result, and we can prune such states from the search space immediately. Pruning theorems can be either specific to a particular protocol, or general theorems that are not restricted to any concrete example. In the latter case they can be proven once and for all and included in the core of the tool. This lets our model checker incorporate results from theorem proving easily and systematically. Note that the interface for supplying user-defined pruning theorems is mainly for convenience reasons for advanced users. For non-expert users, it is not required and often unnecessary to supply their own pruning theorems. Currently Athena contains two built-in pruning theorems and they are shown to be effective and sufficient in most cases in our experiments.
Given a security property formula, Athena first transforms this formula into an initial state. (Note that as explained later in section 4, this initial state is not an insecure state but rather a state which represents a possibly infinite set of protocol executions which satisfy certain properties.) The proof search then starts with this initial state, and new events and participants are added only when necessary according to the exact causal relation. Hence, we reduce the search space by avoiding the exploration of many unnecessary states and paths. In contrast, with forward search all the participating principals have to be pre-stated, which means that one might have to explore many more unnecessary states and paths.
As demonstrated by our experiments (Section 5), all these techniques dramatically reduce the state space explored, and our tool outperforms previous automatic approaches. We discuss various techniques used in Athena in more detail in Section 4.
The paper is organized as follows. We first review some background and the notion of SSM (section 2). Then we introduce a logic to reason about strand spaces and show how to use this logic to specify security properties (section 3). Next we explain our verification algorithm (section 4), show some experimental results and further discussion (section 5), and finally conclude (section 6).
Strand Space Model
This section is primarily a review of concepts developed by Thayer, Herzog and Guttman [36] . First, we explain the notion of terms that are used to represent the messages in the protocols. Then, we introduce strands, strand spaces, and bundles, and show how to represent protocols using strands. Finally, we give a formal description of the penetrator model. 
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¡ £ ¥ ¤ for ¤ iff ¡ ¤ ; or - ¡ £ for ¡ iff ¡ ; or - ¡ £ § ¦ iff ¡ £ ¦ © ¡ § ¦ ; or - ¡ £ ¥ ¦ iff ¡ £ ¦ © ¡ £ © ¡ ¦ . ¢ interm relation ¢ : - ¡ £ ¢ ¥ ¤ for ¤ iff ¡ ¤ ; or - ¡ £ ¢ for ¡ iff ¡ ; or - ¡ £ ¢ § ¦ iff ¡ § ¦ ; or - ¡ £ ¢ ¥ ¦ iff ¡ £ ¢ ¦ © ¡ £ ¢ © ¡ ¦ .
SSM : Strands, Strand Spaces and Bundles
The notions in this subsection are mainly from the paper [36] . We extend them slightly to make them applicable to electronic commerce protocols. Actions. The set of actions Act that principals can take during an execution of a protocol include external actions such as send and receive, and user-defined internal actions such as debit, credit, etc.. In the rest of the paper, we will only use send and receive for simplicity, and denote them and respectively. That is, we will always assume ! " $ # % 
. In other words, a node is a particular event in a given strand, and we will often use nodes as events where it is unambiguous. The proof of this lemma can be found in [36] .
Protocol Specification Using Strands
A protocol usually contains several roles, such as initiators, responders and servers. The sequence of actions of each principal type is predefined by the protocol and represented as a role, or a parameterized strand. Parameters usually include principal names and nonces. We denote a role with parameters by
p arameter list0 . Instantiating parameters of a role yields a particular strand representing a trace of a principal in a protocol run. A legal execution of a protocol forms a bundle, in which the strands of the legitimate principals are restricted to the predefined traces. The strands of the legitimate principals are referred to as regular strands. A bundle can also contain penetrator strands. We explain them in more detail in the next subsection. We now give an example of the Needham-Schroeder protocol [27] with the fix given by Gavin Lowe in [18] . We will refer to this protocol as NSL in the rest of the paper. Using the standard notation, the protocol is as follows.
There are two roles in this protocol: initiator and responder. The strands of the two roles are the following : 
Instantiation and Substitution
In our verification algorithm described in Section 4 we use unification to instantiate roles in a protocol. This section defines the basic notions of substitution, unification, and the most general unifier. We will also apply a substitution to strands, roles, and sets of strands or roles with the obvious meaning. In particular, applying a substitution to a role creates a strand which is an instance of that role. The formal parameters of the role act in this case as free variables. 
The Penetrator Model
We use a similar penetrator model as the one in [36] . The penetrator § has a set of initial knowledge init-info £ © usually contains all the public keys, all the private keys of the penetrator, and all the symmetric keys initially shared between the penetrator and principals playing by the protocol rules. It can also contain keys to model known-key attacks.
A penetrator can intercept messages and generate new messages that are derivable from its initial knowledge and the messages it intercepts. These actions are modeled by a set of penetrator roles.
A penetrator role is one of the following, where 
. Separation into components:
. 
Logic and Model
In this section, we introduce a formal model and a logic to reason about security protocols using the SSM representation, and show how various security properties are expressed in this logic.
Syntax
The syntax of terms consists of strand constants (T
V #T ¦ #888
) and bundle variables (¥
b #888
) . A strand constant may represent a partial strand, and in particular, a single node can be considered as a strand constant.
Propositional formulas are defined as follows: 
Specifying Security Properties in the Logic
Our logic can express a variety of security properties, including ones for authentication, secrecy, and electronic commerce. In this paper we mainly focus on the authentication and secrecy. We use similar ways for representing security properties as in [36] , however, we formulate them using well-formed formulas in our logic.
Authentication.
Gavin Lowe [19] proposed agreement properties for authentication protocols. A protocol guarantees an agreement property for a participant (e.g. acting as a responder) for a certain vector of parameters . Because of the freshness of the nonces generated in the protocol run, usually the agreement property can be proven after the non-injective agreement property is proven, with the argument that there cannot be two strands .
Secrecy.
A value is secret in a strand set if for every bundle ¥ that contains there is no way for the intruder to receive in cleartext; that is, the strand According to the semantics, in order to prove this sequent we need to consider all possible bundles that contain § and check that they all have at least one strand from . We formulate our algorithm as a proof search procedure in a very specialized proof system. First, we encode bundles in a special representation called state. Roughly speaking, a state can be viewed as a collection of properties of bundles, and we say that a state ). The precise definitions and formal semantics of the sequents are given in Section 4.2. To simplify the notation, we will omit the subscript § in the sequent
when the protocol § is unambiguous from the context. Thus, the overall verification procedure is a proof search in a very specialized proof system described in detail in Section 4.3, coupled with a separate algorithm for splitting a state in the A £ x H rule that we introduce in Section 4.4. The resulting verification procedure allows further optimizations which we outline in Section 4.5.
Compact State Representation
Recall that a bundle is an acyclic graph backward closed under "4 " and "R ". It is easy to keep the graph acyclic and backward closed under "4 " while completing it to a bundle, since each strand is finite and usually small. The difficult problem is to make it backward closed under "R ", because generally there might be an infinite number of possible ways of doing it, and we need to consider all possibilities. (Closing under "R " means that every received message must be sent by some other node in the bundle.)
One of the reasons for infinite number of possibilities is unbounded forwarding of messages by the intruder: a node . As we will show later, only the first sender matters, and such forwarding does not change the validity of formulas. Hence, we introduce the semi-bundle structure and the goal-binding mechanism which effectively ignores the infinite message forwarding along with other redundancies in protocol executions, such as the order of interleaving actions. Note that some theorem proving techniques might be able to use forwarding theorems to achieve similar goals [29] , but here we simply use the compact state structures without applying any forwarding theorems in the protocol analysis process. 
Goals. A goal is a pair
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, where Note that ¦ is redundant and can be computed from¨and . We keep it in the state structure for the convenience of illustration.
We say that a strand 
The Proof System and Proof Search Procedure
The skeleton of our verification algorithm is an automatic proof search procedure for the initial sequent § ¥ 0 § © (Formula 4.2). Our proof system consists of three inference rules which we discuss in the rest of this subsection together with the actual proof search algorithm.
Inference Rules
Soundness and Invertibility. An inference rule is called invertible if, whenever the conclusion is provable, then all of the premisses are provable. To simplify the presentation, we use an equivalent dual definition of the invertibility: whenever one of the premisses of a rule is proven false, its conclusion is also false.
The invertibility property is useful for disproving a sequent and providing a counterexample -a successful attack on the protocol. It also allows to search for the proof without backtracking. In the following, we prove that each inference rule is sound and invertible. Init rule. In the first step of the proof search we convert an initial sequent § ¥ 0 § © (Formula 4.2) to another type of sequent contains a contradiction, so its bundle set is empty, and, therefore, the sequent is vacuously true. We will return to this special case in Section 4.5 when we discuss some optimizations to the proof search algorithm. The In addition, we prove that the
rule is invertible for a complete-inclusive . That is, if any of the assumption sequents the following procedure to the current sequent. First we try to apply the 6 y ¤ £ rule, and if it applies, the current sequent is proven. Otherwise we check if the set of unbound goals in the current sequent is empty ( ¦ ), and if it is, the current sequent is proven false. Since all the rules in our proof system are invertible, the original sequent is also false, and the proof search terminates with a failure, returning the current sequent as a counterexample.
If the Since our proof system is so simple and all the inference rules are invertible, there is no need to backtrack. In the implementation we also apply several optimizations to the straightforward proof search procedure. We perform a breadth-first search from the initial sequent and at each step optionally merge the identical sequents that are generated in different branches of the proof tree. Thus, we effectively construct a proof DAG.
Now we state the correctness of the proof search procedure as a theorem. 
be an initial sequent, and be a complete-inclusive next state function. If the proof search procedure described in this section terminates with a complete proof, then the initial sequent is true (soundness); if it refutes a sequent anywhere in the proof, then the initial sequent is false (invertibility).
The proof is a straightforward structural induction over the proof tree that relies on the soundness and invertibility of each inference rule.
The Next State Function
When the current sequent 
¢ '
i s finite, we can see that is complete-inclusive. The proof of this is straightforward and we omit it in this paper.
Notice that due to the most general substitution in goal binding, the nodes and strands in a state may contain free variables. This often allows us to prove a sequent with the minimal possible instantiation of the terms in each state and greatly helps to reduce the search space. In our algorithm we can also easily and systematically incorporate results from theorem proving by using pruning theorems, which can prove that ( is contradictory early in the proof, thus, "pruning" the search space in the current branch of the proof tree. For practical purposes, we require that pruning theorems are expressed as computable predicates such that if The pruning theorems can be specific to a particular protocol, or can be general theorems that are not restricted to any concrete example. The latter can be proven once and for all and included in the core of the tool. Athena also provides an easy interface for the expert users who would like to add their own protocol-specific pruning theorems. Although in general, users do not need to input their own pruning theorems, we provide this easy interface to achieve extensibility of the tool, which enables Athena to be used even for exotic protocols and reduce the search space even further. So far, Athena has two built-in pruning theorems, is contradictory. The proof of this proposition is in [36] .
Optimization: Contradiction Analysis
If all the encrypted messages specified in a protocol are well-typed, in other words, the protocol does not contain encryptions of terms with free variables which can match terms of an arbitrary type, then we can always compute the maximum nesting depth for the encryption operations in any message generated by a legitimate principal (denote this maximum depth by ¢ ). Then the following proposition holds. A proof sketch of this proposition can be found in the appendix. Note that in order to apply proposition 4.9, certain typing requirements in the protocol are needed, namely, all the encrypted messages specified in a protocol must be well-typed. For some protocols this might not hold, and in such cases we specify a threshold for the maximum depth of encryption nesting. A similar restriction is used in other model checkers such as FDR, Mur© , and Brutus. Athena then verifies the correctness of the protocol for an arbitrary configuration, but with the constraints that for any message in the protocol execution, the nesting depth of encryption is no greater than the threshold.
Experimental Results
We have implemented our verification technique in a tool called Athena [33] . The implementation language of Athena is Standard ML of New Jersey [14] , which is freely available on both Windows and Linux platforms [1] .
An input to Athena consists of a protocol description and a set of security properties in a simple and intuitive input language (and possibly, additional pruning theorems, if the user wants to supply his own pruning theorems). A description of a typical protocol from the literature together with its properties takes about half a page in this language, and can be written in a matter of minutes. The tool takes this input and runs completely automatically. If it terminates, it either finds a proof or a counterexample for each security property. In the latter case, a successful attack is constructed from the counterexample, which is illustrated graphically with the help of a graph drawing package Dot [2] . The Dot package is freely available on Windows, Linux and many other platforms [3] .
The latest news on the development of Athena can be found at [35] .
We have run several batches of experiments on a Pentium 133MHz PC with 32 MB RAM. The first batch is the analysis of various security properties of protocols from the collection by Clark and Jacob [7] . We have used Athena to check about 30 protocols from [7] , and almost all of them have running time less than half a second. For example, for the OtwayRees protocol [28] , we have checked six formulas describing authentication properties and obtained the same results as in [12] . The longest execution time for a single formula is 0.38 second, exploring 23 states. On average, each formula takes 0.16 seconds and requires less than 20 states.
Another batch consists of 1641 asymmetric two party authentication protocols constructed by an automatic protocol generator, which is taken from a case study of an approach to automatic security protocol generation [32] . These protocols are already filtered by an attacker filter which eliminates flawed protocols suffering from simple impersonation and replay attacks. Athena analyzes all of the 1641 protocols in 103.8 seconds, with the average of 63.5 milliseconds per protocol, and reports 120 protocols to be correct in terms of mutual authentication.
We have also experimented with protocols for symmetric two party authentication and key distribution with a trusted third party generated by the automatic protocol generator with different sets of security properties [34] . The protocol generator output more than
candidate protocols. Athena took less than two hours to analyze all of them.
Athena can be easily extended with new cryptographic primitives. In fact, adding hash functions and MAC functions only take a few hours of modifying the code from start to finish. In most of our experiments, Athena only needs to search from a dozen to a couple of hundreds of states. When Athena terminates with a proof which contains only a small state space, this automatically indicates that for a given protocol, it is sufficient to just check the correctness of the protocol with a small number of concurrent sessions. This is a side product of the automatic proof procedure in Athena and no manual proofs are involved.
Conclusion
We have presented a new efficient automatic verification technique, Athena, for the analysis of security protocols. It is based on our extension to the Strand Space Model, combined with techniques from both Model Checking and Theorem Proving. It uses a simple logic to specify various security properties and has an automatic proof search procedure for checking the validity of the well-formed formulas in the logic. When Athena terminates, it can either provide a counterexample if the formula does not hold, or generate a proof showing the correctness of the security protocol with arbitrary number of concurrent runs. Typical benchmark protocols from the literature usually take Athena less than a second to find a correctness proof or an attack on the protocol.
Athena exploits several different techniques that enable it to analyze infinite sets of protocol runs and achieve such efficiency. Unlike previous tools, Athena uses the extended Strand Space Model to represent protocol executions. The semi-bundle representation and the goal binding relation comprise a state structure which provides a very compact encoding for (usually infinite) sets of protocol runs. For example, the state structure eliminates the problem of infinite forwarding of messages by using the -minimal requirement in the goal binding. Because the state space in Athena is not an asynchronous composition of local processes, Athena naturally avoids the state space explosion problem caused by the asynchronous composition. The use of free variables and symbolic techniques allows each state to represent an infinite number of concrete protocol executions and reduce the state space explosion problem caused by symmetry redundancy.
As a new approach for security protocol analysis, Athena is still at a very young stage. We look forward to extending the approach in other directions. 
A Proof of the Pruning Theorem
